Courts & Trials

Lawyer Convicted of Murder Granted Bail Pending Appeal

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

Demitry Papasotiriou-Lanteigne (“Papasotiriou”) and his lover, Michael Ivezic (“Ivezic”), were found guilty of first degree murder in the death of Allan Lanteigne (“Lanteigne”) last June following a lengthy trial. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 25 years.

It was alleged that the Papasotiriou and Ivezic were having an affair and conspired to kill Papasotiriou’s spouse in order to access the victim’s $2 million life insurance policy. We previously blogged about this case on June 7, 2018.

Papasotiriou is appealing his conviction and alleges that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable because it was based on circumstantial evidence. The Court of Appeal has recently granted Papasotiriou bail pending his appeal.

PAPASOTIRIOU’S BAIL HISTORY

Papasotiriou was born in Greece and came to Canada at the age of 11 after his parents split up. As a young man, he attended university and law school, and was called to the Ontario Bar. He is currently 38 years old.

Papasotiriou left Canada in 2010 to live in Greece. Ivezic followed Papasotiriou to Greece and lived with him for six months in 2010, prior to returning to Canada in January of 2011. Lanteigne was killed on March 3, 2011. Ivezic returned to Greece on May 14, 2011 to live with Papasotiriou.

Papasotirou returned to Canada on November 1, 2012 to participate in litigation regarding the proceeds of his deceased spouse’s insurance policy. He was arrested the next day.

Papasotirou applied for bail in August 2013, but was denied. He re-applied in November 2013 and provided an improved plan of release to the Court. He was again denied.

On September 11, 2014, Papasotirou was discharged following a preliminary inquiry. However, the Crown immediately launched a certiorari application (a formal request to a court challenging a legal decision alleging that the decision has been irregular or there has been an error of law) and a direct indictment was ordered on October 28, 2014, at which point Papasotirou was arrested.

Papasotirou again applied for bail, which was granted. He was released on a $400,000 recognizance with his mother, sister, and stepfather acting as sureties (person who promises to a judge to supervise an accused person while they are out on bail and pledges an amount of money). He remained out on bail for 3 ½ years with no compliance issues.

At the Court of Appeal, counsel for Papasotiriou proposed a plan for release pending his client’s appeal as follows:

$500,000 recognizance with his mother, stepfather, and stepfather’s mother as sureties;
strict house arrest with very narrow exceptions; and
GPS ankle bracelet to be monitored by Recovery Science Corporation (funded by Papasotiriou).

GROUNDS FOR GRANTING BAIL PENDING APPEAL

Pursuant to section 679(3) of the Criminal Code, a judge of the appeal court may order an appellant released pending appeal if he/she has established the following:

That the appeal is not frivolous;
That he/she will surrender into custody in accordance with the terms of any bail order; and
That the detention is not necessary “in the public interest”.

The “not frivolous” test is a very low bar, and in Papasotiriou’s case the Crown did not suggest to the Court that the appeal is frivolous.

The Crown did, however, argue that Papasotiriou has not discharged his onus to surrender into custody given his ties to Greece. The Court of Appeal, rejected the Crown’s argument on this ground, and held that Papasotirou’s compliance with his pre-trial bail order was “flawless” and the use of electronic monitoring will provide an “extra layer of assurance against absconding”.

The Court stated:

I accept that, standing alone, Mr. Papasotiriou’s connections to Greece may give pause for concern. However, any lingering concerns about flight are answered by his history of bail compliance and the strict release plan that is proposed. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the applicant will surrender into custody in accordance with his bail order.

The Court of Appeal outlined that there are two components which make up the third provision (public interest) to consider in granting bail pending an appeal. These include public safety and confidence in the administration of justice. The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the provision regarding the “public interest” in the case of R. v. Oland. The judicial discretion to grant bail pending appeal involves balancing enforceability (taking into account the gravity of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the potential length of imprisonment) and reviewability interests (taking into account the strength of the grounds of the appeal).

The Crown conceded that Papasotiriou has proven that he will not commit offences if he is released on bail, thus discharging the onus of the public safety component. However, the Crown did take issue with maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of Papasotiriou and held:

The “public interest” requires that I balance all of these factors – the circumstances of the applicant, the nature of the offence, the apparent strength of the appeal, and the time it will take to argue the appeal – to determine whether public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined by Mr. Papasotiriou’s release on bail.

The Court of Appeal maintained that Papasotiriou was not being “turned loose”, but rather carefully monitored in accordance with a stringent release plan (i.e. house arrest, GPS electronic monitoring, and the pledge of $500,000 by his sureties), which is consistent with the proper functioning of the Canadian justice system. Therefore, the Court allowed Papasotiriou’s application and granted him bail pending his appeal.

We will continue to follow any developments in this case as it makes its way through the judicial system and will provide updates in this blog.

In the meantime, to speak with an experienced criminal defence lawyer about charges laid against you or your legal rights, please contact Affleck & Barrison LLP online or at 905-404-1947. We offer a free consultation and are available to help you 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Crown Prosecutors Appealing Decision in Toronto Police Breach of Trust Case

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

Kyle Upjohn (“Upjohn”), an officer with ten years of experience on the police force, was charged with the offence of breach of trust by a public officer contrary to section 122 of the Criminal Code and following a preliminary inquiry he was committed to stand trial. Upjohn successfully brought an application to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice seeking to quash the order committing him to stand trial.

A Crown prosecutor is appealing the decision to quash Upjohn’s criminal trial to Ontario’s highest court maintaining that the lower court Judge erred. Milan Rupic, Crown prosecutor, claims that Justice Maureen Forestall erred in failing to consider “the whole of the evidence” when considering Upjohn’s intent.

Rupic contends that Upjohn allegedly refused to help stop a young man commit suicide in High Park and should stand trial as the cop “knowingly avoided a duty of vital importance”.

WHAT HAPPENED?

On February 2, 2016, a concerned citizen reported to Upjohn, who was parked in his marked police vehicle in High Park, that a young man was preparing to hang himself in the park. Instead of coming to the aid of Alexandre Boucher (“Boucher”), Upjohn allegedly falsely claimed he was on another call and told the man to dial 911 and then drove away.

Subsequently, Upjohn was dispatched to attend to the park where Boucher, a 19-year-old, was later pronounced dead.

Initially, Upjohn was charged with criminal negligence causing death and failing to provide the necessities of life. These charges were withdrawn and Upjohn was charged with breach of trust by a public officer.

THE LOWER COURT DECISION

On application to the Superior Court of Justice, Upjohn’s lawyer argued that a breach of trust case required evidence that the accused had a dishonest or corrupt ulterior purpose for avoiding the call, and that there was no such evidence of this nature. Justice Forestell agreed with this position and quashed Upjohn’s committal to stand trial.

THE ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

The Crown prosecutor has filed an appeal at the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Crown argues that Justice Forestell erred in her decision to quash the trial by failing to consider the “whole of the evidence” in terms of Upjohn’s intent.

The Crown argues that the evidence supports the inference that Upjohn “knowingly avoided a duty of vital importance by means of a deceit”. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that in avoiding his public duty, Upjohn was untrustworthy and the breach of his duty was not for the public good.

The Crown stated:

This was not an innocent mistake. Upjohn masked his failure to act with dishonesty – by lying about being “on a call”. The lie suggests that Upjohn knew what he was doing wrong, that he was intentionally using his office for a purpose other than the public good.

The appeal in this case is scheduled to be heard in November, 2018.

WHAT IS BREACH OF TRUST?

A charge of breach of trust by a public officer is laid when an official is accused of violating the standard of conduct and responsibility demanded by his/her position.

Section 122 of the Criminal Code reads as follows:

Every official who, in connection with the duties of his office, commits fraud or a breach of trust is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, whether or not the fraud or breach of trust would be an offence if it were committed in relation to a private person.

The Supreme Court of Canada set out the elements of the offence of breach of trust by a public officer in R. v. Boulanger:

The accused is an official;
The accused was acting in connection with the duties of his office;
The accused breached the standard of responsibility and conduct demanded of him by the nature of the office;
The conduct of the accused represented a serious and marked departure from the standards expected of an individual in the accused’s position of public trust; and
The accused acted with the intention to use his public office for a purpose other than the public good, for example, for a dishonest, partial, corrupt, or oppressive purpose.

UPJOHN’S CURRENT STATUS

Currently, Upjohn remains suspended with pay from the Toronto Police Service since May 2016.

Upjohn is also accused of three counts of professional misconduct under Ontario’s Police Services Act, including neglect of duty and acting in a disorderly manner.

Under this Act, disciplinary hearings are conducted by police services. A hearing officer must decide whether the allegations of misconduct have been proven on clear and convincing evidence. If an officer is found guilty of misconduct, appropriate penalties may be imposed, including:

a reprimand;
a direction to undergo specific counselling, treatment or training;
a direction to participate in a specified program or activity;
forfeiture of pay or time off;
suspension without pay;
demotion; or
dismissal.

We will report in this blog any developments in this case as they occur, including the decision on appeal.

In the meantime, if you have been charged with a criminal offence or have any questions regarding your legal rights, please contact the experienced criminal lawyers at Affleck & Barrison LLP online or at 905-404-1947. We have a 24-hour phone service for your convenience. We are available when you need us most.

Jury Finds Lovers Guilty of First-Degree Murder

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

After five days of deliberations, a Toronto jury have found Michael Ivezic (“Ivezic”) and Demitry Papasotiriou-Lanteigne (“Papasotiriou-Lanteigne”) guilty of first-degree murder in the death of Allan Lanteigne (“Lanteigne”).

The Crown prosecutor alleged that Ivezic and Papasotiriou-Lanteigne conspired to kill the latter’s spouse in the foyer of his Ossington Avenue home on March 2, 2011. It was alleged that the two accused were having an affair and plotted the crime to access the victim’s $2 million life insurance policy and depart for Greece to start a life together.

The two men will return to court on June 7, 2018 when victim impact statements will be read from Lanteigne’s family. They will also receive their sentence at that time. A first-degree murder conviction carries with it a mandatory sentence of life in prison with no chance of parole for 25 years.

WHAT HAPPENED?

Lanteigne was found dead in his home on March 3, 2011. There were no signs of forced entry and police did not find the murder weapon. An autopsy revealed that Lanteigne was beaten to death.

Lanteigne and Papsotiriou-Lanteigne were married on November 27, 2004. Their relationship “fizzled out” in 2008, although they continued to live together. At some point in 2009, Ivezic and Papasotiriou-Lanteigne began having an affair. Ivezic was even given a key to the house by Papasotiriou-Lanteigne.

By the spring of 2010, Papasotiriou-Lanteigne moved to Greece where his father lived. He continued to pay for airline tickets for Ivezic to visit him. These expenses were paid for by Lanteigne who was working two jobs at the time in Toronto. There were various emails read to the jury written by Lanteigne that indicated that he was tired of giving Papasotiriou-Lanteigne money. Lanteigne threatened to cut off his cheating spouse.

Papasotiriou-Lanteigne was arrested on a visit to Toronto in November, 2012, when he returned to Canada for court proceedings related to his claim for Lanteigne’s life insurance payout.

Ivezic was arrested by authorities in Greece and extradicted to Canada in June, 2013. Ivezic had left his wife and children and was living in Greece with Papsotiriou-Lanteigne as of May 2011.

Both men denied any involvement in the death of Lanteigne.

Crown prosecutors alleged that Papasotirious-Lanteigne “lured” Lanteigne to their home on the evening of his death. An email dated March 2, 2011 was read to the jury from Papasotiriou-Lanteigne requesting that Lanteigne call him in Greece as soon as he got home.

The key piece of evidence was DNA found under the fingernails of the deceased’s right hand belonging to Ivezic. The prosecution argued that this evidence was left as the victim fought for his life. Ivezic argued that his DNA was planted or ended up there as part of an “innocent transfer”. Ivezic suggested that maybe his DNA was transferred to Lanteigne when he and the victim had touched the same surface or when they shared lunch together days before the murder. However, there was no evidence at trial to suggest that Ivezic was friends with the deceased or that they had lunch together.

This case has lasted for many years with both accused challenging every aspect of the case, including allegations that the Crown prosecutors hid disclosure, tampered with police records and evidence, lied to the defence and the court and colluded with police. Furthermore, the accused had more than a dozen defence lawyers and court-appointed lawyers appear on their behalf since they were charged. There was even a period of time during the trial that Ivezic represented himself before the jury.

Following the victim’s death, Papasotiriou filed claims against two firms that insured his spouse as he was seeking $2 million. Papasotiriou is named as the sole beneficiary on the victim’s life insurance policy.

RARE REINSTATEMENT OF FIRST-DEGREE MURDER CHARGE

In September, 2014 following a preliminary hearing, an Ontario Court judge discharged Papasotiriou-Lanteigne, a Toronto lawyer, on the basis that there was not enough evidence to convict him.

A preliminary hearing is held in cases involving serious crimes where the prosecution must show a judge that there is a bare minimum of evidence to justify a full trial. This is often a chance for an accused’s lawyer to see what case the prosecution has against their client.

In October, 2014, the Ministry of the Attorney General signed a preferred indictment that reinstated the first-degree murder charge against Papsotiriou-Lanteigne.

This is a unique occurrence permitted by section 577 of the Criminal Code. The purpose of this section was described by Southin J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the case of R. v. Charlie as follows:

Such a power is arecognition of the ultimate constitutional responsibility of Attorneys General to ensure that those who ought to be brought to trial are brought to trial.

We will continue to follow this case and report in this blog on any developments as they occur.

In the meantime, if you have been charged with a criminal offence or have questions regarding your legal rights, please contact the experienced criminal lawyers at Affleck & Barrison LLP online or at 905-404-1947. We have a 24-hour phone service for your convenience. We are not afraid to fight for your rights and protect your interests.

Court of Appeal Ordered Two Jail Guards to Stand Trial for their Role in Inmate’s Death

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

On March 5, 2014, corrections officers, Leslie Lonsbary (“Lonsbary”) and Stephen Jurkus (“Jurkus”), were charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life following the death of inmate, Adam Kargus (“Kargus”).

Kargus was beaten by his cellmate at the Elgin Middlesex Detention Centre (“EMDC”) and was found dead in a jailhouse shower stall on November 1, 2013. Anthony George pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison (with no possibility of parole for 10 years) last year for beating Kargus to death.

The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently reversed an earlier decision made by Justice A.K. Mitchell of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. At that time, charges against the two guards were dismissed as a result of too much time having passed since they were charged.

LOWER COURT DECISION

At the time of Kargus’ beating and subsequent death, Lonsbary and Jurkus were both employed by the Ministry of Correctional Services at EMDC and on duty.

Following a four month investigation by police, the two men were arrested and charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life to Kargus thereby endangering his life contrary to section 215(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

In February, 2017, Lonsbary and Jurkus brought an application before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice arguing that their constitutional rights had been infringed due to the delay in bringing their case to trial.

A three week jury trial was scheduled to commence on May 8, 2017. The guards submitted that the delay from arrest to the expected completion date of trial would be 1,178 days or 39.3 months. They attributed the delay to the Crown prosecutor and the court.

Applying the formula for delay as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) in the R. v. Jordan (“Jordan”) decision, the lower Court found that the accuseds’ right to be tried within a reasonable period of time was breached. The Court stayed the charges against Lonsbary and Jurkus as the case against them had surpassed the 30-month time limit for trials as set out in the Jordan decision.

WHY IS THE JORDAN DECISION RELEVANT TO THIS CASE?

We have previously blogged about access to justice issues and, more specifically, the commonly criticized length of time it takes for a case to get to trial. The SCC in 2016 set strict time limits for the completion of criminal cases, where there are no exceptional circumstances.

The SCC released its decision in R. v. Jordan on July 8, 2016. In this case, the accused had faced several delays while awaiting his preliminary inquiry and trial. Jordan was eventually convicted of five drug-related offences after 49.5 months. At the beginning of his trial, Jordan brought an application requesting a stay of proceedings due to his constitutional rights being infringed by an unreasonable delay. His application was dismissed. Jordan’s appeal to the Supreme Court of British Columbia was also dismissed.

Jordan proceeded to appeal to the SCC. His appeal was granted, his convictions were set aside and the proceedings were stayed. In this decision, the SCC clearly set out a formula to calculate the amount of time between the initial charge and the actual or anticipated end of trial. The SCC set a ceiling for unreasonable delays at 18 months for cases tried in provincial courts and 30 months for cases to be tried in provincial and superior courts after a preliminary inquiry, except under exceptional circumstances that were reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable.

ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL

Crown prosecutors appealed the lower court decision to stay proceedings against Lonsbary and Jurkus to the Ontario Court of Appeal (“ONCA”). The Crown argued that the lower court Judge made errors in applying the time frame rules.

According to Justice Fairburn, writing on behalf of the ONCA, delays that were caused by the defence or by “exceptional circumstances” (which can include specific incidents or the general complexity of the case) do not count toward the 30-month ceiling for criminal proceedings.

In conclusion, the ONCA found that there was “no unreasonable delay” and ordered Lonsbary and Jurkus to stand trial.

The two jail guards have the right to appeal the Ontario Court of Appeal ruling. We will continue to follow this case and report on any developments as they take place in this blog.

If you have been charged with a criminal offence or have any questions regarding your legal rights, please contact the experienced criminal lawyers at Affleck & Barrison LLP online or at 905-404-1947. We have a 24-hour phone service for your convenience. We are available when you need us most.

Supreme Court Upholds First Degree Murder Convictions for Death of 6-Year-Old

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has upheld the first-degree murder convictions of Spencer Jordan (“Jordan”) and Marie Magoon (“Magoon”), who were charged in the death of six-year-old Meika Jordan (“Meika”).

Defence lawyers requested that the SCC reverse a decision by the Alberta Court of Appeal, which upgraded Jordan and Magoon’s second-degree murder convictions after ruling that Meika had been confined prior to her death (a condition that automatically increases the severity of a murder offence).

Under the original second-degree murder convictions, Jordan and Magoon had been sentenced to life in prison without parole for a minimum of 17 years. The upgraded first-degree murder convictions carry an automatic life sentence with no chance of parole for 25 years.

WHAT HAPPENED?

On November 14, 2011, Meika died after spending the weekend at the home of her father, Jordan, and stepmother, Magoon. The six-year-old was tortured for days leading up to her death by being forced to run stairs, dragged up and down the stairs by her ankles, repeatedly hit and even burned. She suffered damage to her internal organs and a subdural hematoma and cerebral swelling caused by at least five blows to her head. No medical attention was sought until Meika was in complete cardiac and respiratory failure. Jordan and Magoon told police that Meika had fallen down the stairs, however, the medical evidence supported a pattern of frequent and intentional violence.

Jordan and Magoon were charged with first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder at trial in 2015. They appealed their convictions and the Crown prosecutors appealed the first degree murder acquittals. The Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the accuseds’ appeals, but allowed the Crown appeals. The Appeal Court held that the accused unlawfully confined Meika rendering them liable for first degree murder under section 231(5) of the Criminal Code of Canada (“CC”).

The SCC refused to hear an appeal to have the convictions entirely quashed, but did hear arguments on the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision to upgrade the charge from second-degree murder to first-degree murder.

The nine SCC justices took less than 10 minutes to come to the decision to dismiss all appeals in November, 2017. The SCC found that the Court of Appeal did not err in substituting verdicts of guilty of murder in the first degree. The written reasons for the ruling were released on April 13, 2018.

MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE

The crime of murder is deemed as the most vicious of crimes in Canadian society. This is reflected in the harshness of the sanctions and punishments for this crime.

In Canada, there are two divisions of murder and one of manslaughter. First degree murder is planned and deliberate (with a few exceptions), whereas second degree murder is defined as murder that is not first degree (not premeditated). Manslaughter is defined as a homicide committed without the intention to cause death.

First degree murder bears an automatic life sentence with no possibility of parole for 25 years. Once on parole, offenders remain on parole for the rest of their life and must report to a parole officer and are subject to conditions of their parole. If any of the conditions of parole are broken, they are sent directly back to prison without a hearing.

WHAT IS FIRST DEGREE MURDER UNDER SECTION 231(5) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE?

There are some homicides automatically deemed first degree murder, even if they were not intentional or planned. These include assassination of a police officer or prison employee on duty (section 231(4) of the CC) or murder committed in conjunction with one of the following offences (section 231 (5) of the CC):

hijacking;
sexual assault;
sexual assault with a weapon;
aggravated sexual assault;
kidnapping;
forcible confinement;
hostage taking;
terrorism;
intimidation;
criminal harassment; or
any offence committed on behalf of a criminal organization.

The section of the CC that was applied in Meika’s case was section 231(5)(e), which reads as follows:

(5) Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and deliberate on the part of any person, murder is first degree murder in respect of a person when the death is caused by that person while committing or attempting to commit an offence under one of the following sections:

(e) section 279 (kidnapping and forcible confinement);

The case of R. v. Pritchard explained Parliament’s intention to “treat murders committed in connection with crimes of domination as particularly blameworthy and deserving of more severe punishment”.

The applicable test to be applied in determining guilt of first degree murder under section 231(5)(e) of the CC was set out in R. v. Harbottle. The Crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that:

the accused was guilty of the underlying crime of domination or of attempting to commit that crime;
the accused was guilty of the murder of the victim;
the accused participated in the murder in such a manner that he/she was a substantial cause of the death of the victim;
there was no intervening act of another which resulted in the accused no longer being substantially connected to the death of the victim; and
the crimes of domination and murder were part of the same transaction.

In Meika’s case, the SCC found that although there were no physical restraints used, Meika was physically restrained and restricted to remain in her bedroom or the basement. Furthermore, given the parent child relationship there is less of a requirement for physical restraints due to the unequal relationship that exists. “[D]isciplining a child by restricting his or her ability to move about freely (by physical or psychological means), contrary to the child’s wishes, which exceeds the outer bounds of punishment that a parent or guardian could lawfully administer, constitutes unlawful confinement.” Therefore, the SCC found that the Harbottle test was met.

If you have been charged with a serious offence or have any questions regarding your legal rights, please contact the experienced criminal lawyers at Affleck & Barrison LLP online or at 905-404-1947. We offer a 24-hour phone service to protect your rights and to ensure that you have access to justice at all times.

Major Changes Proposed to Unclog Canada’s Criminal Courts

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

Last week, the Liberal government proposed a new bill, Bill C-75, to modernize Canada’s criminal justice system and speed up court proceedings by amending the Criminal Code, Youth Criminal Justice Act and other laws. The changes include eliminating preliminary inquiries (except in cases of crimes that carry a life sentence), ending peremptory challenges in jury selection, addressing intimate partner violence, creating a higher threshold for bail and increasing sentences for repeat offenders.

Federal Justice Minister Jody Wilson-Raybould said the new bill aims “to make our criminal justice system more effective and efficient while respecting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. More importantly, it will make a significant contribution to a necessary culture shift in the way our criminal justice system operates.”

Here are some of the highlights from Bill C-75:

PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES

One of the most controversial features of Bill C-75 is the proposal to eliminate preliminary inquiries in the majority of criminal proceedings.

A preliminary inquiry is an optional hearing requested by either the accused or the Crown prosecutor. It is available where an adult is charged with an indictable offence and elects to be tried by the Superior Court. Preliminary inquiries determine if there is enough evidence to send the accused to trial. It is a process by which the Crown and the accused test the evidence to be used at trial.

Under the proposed legislation, only an adult accused of a crime punishable by life imprisonment would be able to request a preliminary inquiry. The preliminary inquiry judge would also be able to limit the issues to be considered and the witnesses.

The government justifies this proposal claiming that it will reduce the number of preliminary inquiries, thus freeing up court time and reducing the burden on some witnesses and victims. Specifically, this would protect sexual assault victims from having to testify twice – once at the preliminary inquiry stage and once at the trial.

This proposal will eliminate the number of preliminary inquiries by 87%. There are currently more than 9,000 preliminary inquiries held each year.

Many criminal defence lawyers oppose this proposal. They take the position that the preliminary inquiry process can eliminate cases that do not have enough evidence to proceed to trial. Furthermore, preliminary inquiries can save a lot of time down the road by narrowing issues, shortening trials and sometimes even eliminating the need for trials.

INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

Under the proposed legislation, the more inclusive “intimate partner” wording would replace “spouse” and “common-law partner” and the definition would be broadened to include past partners.

Bill C-75 also introduces a reverse onus imposed at the bail hearing of an accused charged with an offence involving intimate partner violence and repeat abusers (rather than placing the onus on the Crown to make a case for keeping the accused incarcerated).

The new legislation would make strangulation an elevated form of assault (in conjunction with assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm) and allows a higher maximum penalty in cases involving repeat domestic abusers.

BAIL

Bill C-75 proposes to update and modernize bail practices by allowing police and judges more flexibility to deal with criminal charges. Police would be given the authority to impose appropriate conditions on accused individuals without having to seek court approval.

JURY SELECTION

The impetus to rework the jury selection process in Bill C-75 comes in response to the public’s reaction to the acquittal of Gerald Stanley, which we have previously blogged about. In this case, an all-white jury found Gerald Stanley not guilty in the shooting death of Colten Boushie, a young Indigenous man.

The government proposes to improve the jury selection process and seeks to encourage diversity by abolishing peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges allow defence counsel or Crown prosecutors to exclude a potential juror without giving a reason. The government maintains that ending peremptory challenges will prevent counsel from excluding minority candidates from juries. The proposed legislation will allow judges to decide whether to exclude jurors that have been challenged by either the prosecution or defence.

Bill C-75 still needs to be debated and approved before becoming law. We will continue to provide updates regarding the status of this Bill as it becomes available.

In the meantime, if you have questions regarding charges laid against you or your legal rights, please contact the experienced criminal lawyers at Affleck & Barrison at 905-404-1947 or contact us online. We offer a free consultation and are available to help you 24/7.

Jury Finds Anne Norris Not Criminally Responsible in Death of Marcel Reardon

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

A Newfoundland jury found Anne Norris (“Norris”) not criminally responsible in the death of 46-year-old Marcel Reardon (“Reardon”).

Following the verdict, Norris has been placed in the custody of the Newfoundland and Labrador Criminal Mental Disorder Review Board for psychiatric treatment.

WHAT HAPPENED?

Norris pleaded not guilty to first-degree murder in Reardon’s death, but admitted to repeatedly hitting him in the head with a hammer early in the morning of May 9, 2016.

The following details admitted by Norris were presented to the jury:

Norris socialized with Reardon and two others downtown in St. John’s on May 8, 2016, before leaving alone and going to Walmart on Topsail Road;
Norris purchased a knife and a 16 oz. Stanley hammer at a Walmart hours before the incident;
Norris returned downtown and in the early morning hours of May 9, 2016 she and Reardon took a cab to Harbour View Apartments on Brazil Street, where she lived;
Norris killed Reardon by striking him several times in the head with the hammer, then moved his body under a set of concrete steps;
Norris put the murder weapon, her jeans and some rope into a borrowed backpack and threw it in St. John’s harbour;
The backpack was recovered two days later and turned over to the police; and
Norris admitted to owning a sock, scarf, bathrobe and a pair of sneakers taken by police from her apartment, which were found to contain Reardon’s blood.

The issues at trial were whether or not Norris was mentally sound enough to be criminally responsible for Reardon’s death, and if so, whether or not the killing included the intent and planning required for first-degree murder.

Norris’ lawyers maintained that she was suffering from a mental disorder when she attacked Reardon and therefore should be found “not criminally responsible”. Her lawyers suggested that Norris was “a ticking time bomb” and had been on a “downward spiral” since the age of 24. She has received treatment in the past for psychosis and has a longtime belief that she was being sexually assaulted by various men while she slept. She had been released from the Waterford Hospital practically untreated days before she killed Reardon. Lawyers argued that Norris thought Reardon was going to sexually assault her and that’s why she attacked him.

On the other hand, Crown prosecutors argued that the evidence demonstrated that Norris was not delusional and planned a deliberate killing, even going so far as to dispose of the weapon. Lawyers for the Crown reasoned that although Norris had a mental illness, there was no evidence of her being symptomatic at the time of the attack.

The trial lasted one month and 31 witnesses were called, including police officers, friends of Norris, Norris’ father, employees of Walmart, the province’s chief medical examiner, five psychiatrists and one psychologist.

WHAT DOES “NOT CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE” MEAN?

Not criminally responsible (“NCR”) is defined in section 16 of the Criminal Code. An individual is NCR if he/she was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the offence, and:

the mental disorder made it impossible for him/her to understand the nature and quality of what he/she did; or
the mental disorder made it impossible for him/her to understand that what he/she did was morally wrong, not just legally wrong.

The party raising the issue of NCR has the burden. More likely than not it is the defence who must prove the accused is NCR on the “balance of probabilities”.

Once an individual is found NCR, he/she is not acquitted. Instead the individual is diverted to a provincial or territorial review board (pursuant to section 672.38 of the Criminal Code), which are independent tribunals made up of at least five people, including a licensed psychiatrist. Each year cases are heard by the board at which point the board can impose one of the following:

that the individual remain detained in a hospital with varying levels of privileges;
that the individual be released on a conditional discharge (individuals are allowed into the community where they have substantial freedom and relatively light conditions); or
that the individual be released on an absolute discharge (individuals are released into the community without any supervision).

Absolute discharges are only granted when the board finds the individual is not a “significant threat” to public safety.

The Crown, in this case, has 30 days to decide whether it will seek to appeal the verdict. In the meantime, Norris will remain in psychiatric care until a review board deems her fit to be released into the community.

30 Days in Jail for Man Convicted of Drinking and Driving

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

An Ontario man, who was convicted of drunk driving (over 80 driving), was recently sentenced to 30 days in jail despite having no criminal record.

WHAT HAPPENED?

In the early morning hours of September 2, 2016, a serious car accident took place in front of the Riverside Inn in Bracebridge, Ontario.

The driver in question, Brandon Greavette, was in a pick-up truck which left the roadway, knocked down a light standard, and damaged vehicles in the parking lot of the Riverside Inn before coming to a stop on top of the dislodged light standard. The airbags of his truck were set off by the impact. One of the front wheels of a small sedan were knocked off the car and the axle and suspension unit were found lying on the roadway.

Greavette, 26 years of age, only suffered minor cuts to his face as a result of the collision. He admitted to a police officer at the scene that he had been the driver of the pick-up truck and that he had been drinking. He had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, an inability to focus, and an odour of alcohol on his breath and body. He had trouble balancing and stumbled on his way to the police car. Greavette provided two breath samples into a breathalyzer and was arrested at the scene. His readings were 140 and 130 mg of alcohol in 100 mg of blood.

Greavette was convicted of Over 80 driving following his trial on October 19, 2017 and Justice David Rose provided reasons for sentencing on January 10, 2018.

SENTENCING PRINCIPLES IN CANADA

If an accused pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial, the Court must then determine a sentence that is fair given all of the circumstances, the seriousness of the offence, and the offender’s degree of responsibility.

The Court may increase or decrease a sentence when reviewing all of the aggravating and mitigating factors relating to the offender and the offence.

An aggravating factor is something that can serve to increase the sentence, for example the offender’s criminal record. A mitigating factor is something that can serve to decrease the sentence, such as a good work history which can indicate good character.

Under section 718 of the Criminal Code, Canadian courts must impose just sentences that have one or more of the following objectives:

denounce the unlawful conduct and harm to the victim or the community;
deter the offender and others from committing crimes;
separate offenders from society, when necessary;
rehabilitate the offender;
provide reparations for harm done to the victim or the community; and
promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done.

SENTENCING JUDGMENT

In making his sentencing decision, Justice Rose took into account various factors including rehabilitation, Greavette’s degree of responsibility, the fact that he was a first-time offender, and deterrence.

The mitigating factors in this case included the fact that Greavette is a relatively youthful first-time offender who has a supportive family and a good job. However, Justice Rose noted that this was tempered by the fact that Greavette continues to abuse alcohol socially which leads to assaultive behaviour.

In addition, although Greavette has no prior criminal record, the Court noted that he had several driving-related offences (i.e. Provincial Offences Act violations) on file which included four speeding tickets, tailgating, failing to stop at a signal or crosswalk, and careless driving. He had also been ticketed in 2016 for consumption of alcohol in public. These were aggravating factors.

In addition to Greavette’s problematic-driving record, additional aggravating factors included the troubling damage from the collision (including damage to the two vehicles, property damage to the light fixture, and damage to other vehicles in the parking lot at the Riverside Inn).

Justice Rose also noted that there were 6 individuals who walked away from the accident virtually and miraculously unharmed. He emphasized the devastating consequences that drunk drivers have on Canadian society and went on to cite various cases which reiterate that drinking and driving offences are serious crimes and must be treated this way by the courts.

Given all of the above these factors, Justice Rose held that this case calls for a deterrent sentence.

The Pre-Sentence Report “supports the finding that Mr. Greavette accepts responsibility for this offence but has not yet understood that when he drinks bad things happen”.

Justice Rose wrote,

After reflection I have come to the conclusion that neither a fine, nor a conditional sentence order will meet the required principals of sentencing. I do not take lightly the decision to jail a first offender, but after reflection I have determined that the sentence will be 30 days in jail.

In addition to time in jail, Greavette is to be placed on probation for 1 year following his jail sentence, must attend counselling for alcohol abuse and obey a curfew set by the probation officer. He will also undergo an 18 month driving prohibition.

If you have been charged with a driving offence or have any questions regarding your legal rights, please contact the experienced criminal lawyers at Affleck & Barrison LLP online or at 905-404-1947. We have a 24-hour phone service for your convenience.

Appeal Court Upholds Parents’ Conviction in Son’s Meningitis Death

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

A panel of Appeal Court judges in Alberta dismissed the appeal of a couple who were found guilty of failing to provide the necessaries of life to their 19 month old son, who died of meningitis in 2012.

WHAT HAPPENED?

In 2016, David and Collet Stephan were convicted by a jury for failing to provide the necessaries of life in their son Ezekiel’s 2012 death. They had treated their son with natural remedies rather than taking him to a doctor when he had become ill.

A panel of Appeal Court judges in Alberta dismissed the appeal. Justice Bruce McDonald, writing for the majority, wrote,

This evidence supports the conclusion that they actively failed to do what a reasonably prudent and ordinary parent would do.

During the trial, jurors heard evidence that the Stephans used natural remedies and homemade smoothies containing hot pepper, ginger root, horseradish and onion rather than seek medical care. Ezekiel became too stiff to sit in his car seat and had to lie on a mattress when his father drove him from his home to a naturopathic clinic to pick up additional herbal supplements.

The Stephans did not call for medical assistance until their son stopped breathing. He was then rushed to a local hospital, but died after being transported by air ambulance to a Children’s Hospital in Calgary.

THE TRIAL AND APPEAL

According to the Stephans’ lawyers, the trial was a “battle of experts”. The Stephans argued that the convictions should be overturned because the trial judge erred in allowing too many Crown experts to testify, the medical jargon confused jurors, and the defence expert’s testimony was restricted. The majority of the Appeal Court dismissed all grounds of appeal.

The Stephans’ lawyers also argued that their clients’ Charter rights had been violated because of the unreasonable delay between the time they were charged to the date they were convicted. This aspect of the appeal was also dismissed with the Court finding the delay was not unreasonable.

DISSENTING OPINION ON APPEAL

Justice Brian O’Ferrall wrote a dissenting opinion in favour of a new trial. He felt that the trial judge’s charge to the jury was confusing and misleading. Justice O’Ferrall did, however, agree with the majority of the Court in finding that the Stephans’ right to be tried within a reasonable time had not been infringed.

SENTENCING

David Stephan was sentenced to four months in jail and his wife, Collet, was sentenced to three months of house arrest. They were both ordered to complete 240 hours of community service. The trial Judge also ordered that the Stephans’ three other children see a medical doctor at least once a year.

WHAT COMES NEXT?

Given that one of the three judges on the appeal panel dissented, the Stephans have an automatic right to have the Supreme Court of Canada hear arguments in their case. The Supreme Court has set a tentative date to hear arguments on May 15, 2018 for the couple.

The Crown prosecutors have filed their own appeal where they will argue that the couple should face stiffer sentences before another panel of Court of Appeal judges. A date for these arguments has not yet been set.

NECESSARIES OF LIFE

The Criminal Code of Canada requires that every parent, foster parent, or guardian is required to provide necessaries of life for a child under the age of 16 years of age.

A parent is responsible for the care, supervision, maintenance and support of his/her children. At a minimum, this obligation entails the provision of food and shelter. The Courts have also found that the failure to seek medical attention can be categorized as a “failure to provide the necessaries of life”.

The prosecution, in a case such as the Stephans, is required to prove that:

The accused was under a legal duty to provide the necessaries of life to a child under the age of 16 years;
The accused failed to provide the necessaries of life to a child under the age of 16 years;
This failure endangered the child’s life or was likely to cause the health of that child to be endangered permanently; and,
The conduct of the accused represented a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable parent, foster parent, or guardian in the same circumstances.

We will continue to follow the developments in this case and will provide updates on this blog as they become available.

In the meantime, if you are facing charges or have questions regarding your legal rights, please contact the experienced criminal lawyers at Affleck & Barrison LLP online or at 905-404-1947. For your convenience, we offer 24-hour phone services. We are available when you need us most.

Driver Found Not Guilty in Car Accident that Killed Pedestrian and Her Dog

Written on Behalf of Affleck & Barrison LLP

On November 21, 2017, Mr. Justice Peter Bawden found Gideon Fekre not guilty of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death.

WHAT HAPPENED?

In April 2015, 18-year old Fekre was driving on Dundas St. E. approaching Carlaw Avenue when he crossed a bike lane and drove onto the sidewalk for 20 metres, ultimately striking and killing Kristy Hodgson and one of her two dogs that she was walking.

Fekre told the Court,

I was coming down Dundas from the Eaton Centre….My water bottle dropped, and I reacted, is the best way of putting it. I reached down with my right hand to pick it up, kept my left hand on the steering wheel. …[I realized] the direction I was heading was onto the sidewalk toward a woman and her dogs.

Fekre testified at trial that he tried to avoid Hodgson by hitting his brakes and turning the steering wheel towards the road, but was unsuccessful.

Police officers testified that Fekre’s car had left the roadway, crossed a bike lane, and driven on the sidewalk for more than 20 metres at approximately 52 kilometres per hour. Fekre had told the officers at the scene that he had taken his eyes off the road for “just a second” while trying to retrieve a water bottle that had fallen onto the floor beneath his feet.

THE OFFENCE: DANGEROUS OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE CAUSING DEATH

The criminal charge of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death is a serious criminal offence punishable by up to 14 years in prison as set out in section 249(4) of the Criminal Code of Canada. This offence consists of two components:

the prohibited conduct (operating a motor vehicle in a dangerous manner resulting in death); and,
the required degree of fault (marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in all the circumstances).

In the 2012 case of R. v. Roy, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified the legal principles to be applied in determining the criminal standard for dangerous driving. The Court set out the two questions to ask in determining whether the fault component is present:

In light of all of the relevant evidence, would a reasonable person have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible?
Was the accused’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it, if possible, a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances?

In the case of R. v. Roy, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the trial judge erred in law by inferring from the fact that Roy had committed a dangerous act while driving that his conduct displayed a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal.

DECISION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE

The real question before the court was whether Fekre’s reaction in the less than two seconds was a “marked deviation” from what a “reasonably prudent” driver would do under the circumstances.

Was it [reaching for a water bottle] a marked departure from what a reasonable driver would have done?

Justice Bawden found that the Crown prosecutor had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Fekre made a conscious decision to divert his attention at an essential moment while driving. He did state that the driving in question could lead to liability in a civil trial, but he did not meet the higher criminal standard for dangerous driving outlined by previous decisions before the Supreme Court of Canada.

Justice Bawden specified that the duration of the interruption in attention while driving was essential in coming to his decision. The evidence showed a period of inattention lasting between 0.74 seconds to 1.18 seconds. This, according to Justice Bawden, qualified as a “momentary lapse of attention” which had been deemed non-criminal by the Supreme Court. He stated, “We cannot hold drivers to a standard of ideal decision-making when making split-second decisions”. He found that Fekre made an “imprudent but reflexive decision”.

Furthermore, Fekre’s behavior at the scene showed concern for the victim and dramatic remorse, which enhanced his credibility.

CHANGES IN THE FUTURE

The Liberal government currently has a proposal on the table to establish new road safety measures, which we have previously blogged about.

The proposed legislation includes the offence of careless driving resulting in death or bodily harm with a maximum fine of $50,000.00, license suspension, and imprisonment. We will provide updates regarding this new legislation as information becomes available.

If you are facing a dangerous driving charge or have any questions regarding your legal rights, contact Affleck & Barrison LLP online or at 905-404-1947. We have a 24-hour phone service for your convenience.